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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1. The weakest point in Soviet industrial economy is the deficiency of oil. In 1948 the USSR controlled nine percent of the world's supply. In view of developments elsewhere, the figure cannot be increased in the USSR's favor. This production, which includes the production of satellites, is insufficient for the most elementary needs of a peacetime economy.
2. [redacted] they are opposed to the German type of blitz warfare but are generally oriented toward the necessity of a war of attrition.
3. In view of the above two factors, a general war with the USSR must be preceded by a local war in the Middle East to assure the Soviets of an oil supply.
4. The production of synthetic gasoline requires the availability of electricity and of raw materials which are generally in short supply in Soviet economy. In any case, even full production from those plants which were available in 1947-48 would not produce sufficient gasoline for a war.
5. With the production of SK/A (calcium carbide), SK/B (ethylene from potato ethyl alcohol), and German Buna, the USSR can produce enough synthetic rubber even for a war of attrition.
6. Other weak points in the Soviet economy have no bearing on the Soviet decision to engage in a war, because these are difficulties of geographical distribution of raw materials and, under Soviet totalitarianism, can be overcome.
7. Only wishful thinking and a lack of knowledge of the Soviet police state can encourage the illusion that the Soviet regime can be overthrown internally. The only group in the past or the present, [redacted] which is able to develop anti-Cominform propaganda in the USSR is the JU/TA (sic) offensive service, which has preserved valuable ties with Moscow.

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8. It is an illusion to suppose that air bombardment can resolve a war with the USSR. Even with the neutralization of Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, and the oil centers of Baku, Batumi, and Tbilisi, the USSR could continue a war on the industrial resources of Siberia and Turkestan, where production is very much decentralized and camouflaged against air observation.
9. Whatever its strength, Soviet aviation will never be efficient and would rapidly deteriorate under war conditions by reason of shortages of pilots and maintenance.
10. Soviet workmen are generally inept in the use of fine or semi-fine machines. Witness of this fact is the severe average attrition of machinery run by them. However, the Soviets are well adapted to the operation of heavy industry, and especially foundries. Also, the workmen are capable of producing under any psychological condition; they could produce under heavy bombardment, a shortage of food, or a severe blow to morale.
11. War with the Soviet Union will be decided by military rather than political factors, and the most important individuals are the military-politicos Bulganin, Beriya, and Malenkov.
12. In conclusion, the USSR is presently not prepared to face a decisive conflict; therefore, it cannot wish for one. The Soviet Union needs at least two years for essential preparations. However, it will start a war or accept one without compromise if present [redacted] pressure is substantially increased.

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